| 主讲人简介： | Olli-Pekka Kuusela is a Research Fellow at the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, UNU-WIDER, and Docent in Environmental and Resource Economics at the University of Helsinki. He earned his PhD from Virginia Tech in 2013. His current research includes projects on green fiscal policies, the energy transition, and the management of natural capital, with a focus on taxation in the extractives sector. His recent work on the macroeconomic effects of carbon taxation, including the present project, uses quantitative general-equilibrium models to study the fiscal, welfare, and labor-market impacts of the green transition. |
| 讲座简介： | How costly is unilateral carbon taxation in a country that accounts for only a small share of global emissions? This paper studies the macroeconomic and welfare effects of a Finnish carbon tax designed to deliver a 40 percent reduction in long-run emissions. The analysis uses a quantitative general-equilibrium macro-climate model calibrated to the Finnish economy. We extend the search-and-matching framework of Finkelstein Shapiro and Metcalf (2023) in two ways. First, we divide the clean side of the economy into high- and low-productivity technologies, generating two endogenous productivity cutoffs rather than one. Second, we introduce sector-specific physical capital subject to Jermann adjustment costs.
The three-sector structure changes the implications of the two-sector benchmark. In the Finnish calibration, many workers leaving the polluting sector move into the low-productivity clean technology rather than the high-productivity one. This reallocation generates real-wage declines across all three sectors and a small negative welfare effect. The required fiscal stringency, however, is modest. Comparing unilateral and coordinated policy experiments under the same domestic carbon tax, we find that consumption-equivalent welfare improves substantially under coordination because of avoided climate damages. Higher capital-adjustment frictions and exogenous progress in abatement technology both reduce the welfare cost of unilateral policy. |
